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EDITORS’ PREFACE 
 
Saer El-Jaichi 
 
 
The contributions presented in this issue deal with a range of debates 
and questions in contemporary Arab-Islamic thought, focusing 
especially on the ideas, and key methodological approaches, of 
prominent twentieth-century Arabic-speaking thinkers who attempt in 
various ways, and from various intellectual positions, to revive (iḥyāʾ) 
and renew (tağdīd) the tradition of Islām against the backdrop of 
modern thought. Historically speaking, the endeavour toward reviving 
the cultural and religious legacy of Islām within the context of 
modernity began in the early nineteenth century in direct response to 
European invasions of the Muslim lands, starting with the Napoleonic 
invasion of Egypt in 1798. Indeed, in many ways, contemporary 
Arab-Islamic thought emerged in response to the shock of Western 
modernity – that is, the unexpected shock that left Muslims with a 
feeling of inferiority and backwardness vis-à-vis the Christian West 
due to the latter’s economic, political and technological advances, and 
military superiority. In the face of this somehow traumatic event, one 
question, which would be repeated countless times in ideological 
writings, historical studies, and even fictional works, became 
especially urgent: “Why did the Renaissance, which fostered the Age 
of Enlightenment, emerge out of Western thought, not Arab-Islamic 
thought?” Thus, when Muslim thinkers began to understand why 
modernity has arisen in the West, they were conscious of the close 
correlation between the development of European intellectual culture 
and its culmination in the (re)birth of the Renaissance culture in all its 
multifarious aspects.  
To be sure, to explain the factors that stimulated the emergence 
of Western modernity one needs to account for the historical origins 
of the Renaissance. In other words, to reflect upon Western modernity 
is essentially to reflect upon the historical origins of the Renaissance. 
But what precisely does the term “Renaissance” mean, and what does 
it tell us about the transition from pre-modern to modern Europe? Put 
in very simple terms, what is now called the Renaissance, that is, the 
“age of transition to the modern world”, signifies socio-political, 
economic, and cultural processes, made possible in the 14th and 15th 
centuries first and foremost thanks to the dissolution of the feudal 
mode of production and its replacement with new conditions that led 
to the capitalist mode of production. These processes in turn made 
possible the rupture with the medieval past, thus providing “some of 
the foundations for the later Scientific and Industrial Revolutions” – 
including the rise of Protestantism, a renewal of interest in classical 
learning, and the invention of the printing press” (J. J. Martin, 2003: 
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30; A. Lucas, 2010: 987). Thus what is now called “Renaissance” is, 
culturally speaking, a transformation accomplished through a process, 
“which was marked particularly by a revival of the influence of 
classical antiquity” (G. Griffiths 1988: 92). Put in a nutshell, changes 
in material circumstances culminated in the 15th century in a whole 
new mode of thinking, which made its first significant impact with the 
revival of interest in the legacy of Greek rationality.  
If we now look to the Arab-Islamic context, we almost 
inevitably end up turning our attention to the widely used Arabic 
equivalent term for ‘renaissance’, nahḍa, which designates two 
separate kinds of revivals: first, the revival in medieval times known 
as the “Graeco-Arabic Renaissance”, which marks the rebirth of the 
Greek legacy in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries of Islām (Kraemer 
1992: 135; also F. Rosenthal 1975: 1-14; D. Gutas 2012: 1-11); and 
secondly, the above-mentioned revival attempts in the modern era, 
initiated in response to Napoleon’s invasion in 1798.   
  
 
The Graeco-Arabic nahḍa in medieval times: why did it fail? 
 
The Renaissance in medieval Islām took place during the reign of the 
ʿAbbāsid’s beginning in the 3rd/9th century until about the 7th/13th 
century. The extraordinary success of this Renaissance, which we 
know today as the “Graeco-Arabic nahḍa,” had its roots in material 
conditions that gave rise to power and economic wealth, which in turn 
stimulated the intellectual and social dynamism of the ʿAbbāsid 
caliphate. Indeed, both power and economic wealth were crucial to 
the making of the Arab-Islamic culture and its leading place in the 
medieval world. Already during the early centuries of its reign, the 
ʿAbbāsid caliphate expanded its rule to the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, North Africa and large areas of central Asia. As a result, most 
of “Byzantium’s eastern trade” came under Islamic control (A. Dal, 
2010: 28; H. C. Evans 2012: 4-11). The growth of trade in these 
newly conquered territories – which also resulted in ʿAbbāsid control 
of seaports and sea routes in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, as well as 
the Indian Ocean - led not only to economic growth and centralisation 
of administration but, as we now know, also to a process of cross-
cultural fertilization. More precisely, the basic precondition for 
cultural prosperity in the ʿAbbāsid era was the prosperity in the 
ʿAbbāsid economy. This prosperity was a major factor behind the new 
Weltanschauung under which the new elite could unify despite its 
ethnic, cultural, and religious diversities. This trajectory of increasing 
complexity at the economic and the cultural levels in the 
cosmopolitan capital of Baġdād, beginning especially with the reigns 
of al-Manṣūr (714 AD – 775 AD) and Harūn ar-Rašīd (786 AD – 809 
AD), fostered new forms of scholarly inquiry in response to certain 
epistemic demands that had not existed in the past, that is, before the 
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phase of the caliphate’s dynamic transformation and the rise of the 
intellectual climate in which this transformation took shape (from the 
8th and 9th centuries AD onwards). The Graeco-Arabic renaissance, 
which embraced “the translation movement of ancient science and 
philosophy from Greek into Arabic,” saw daylight precisely in the 
context of this climate.1 
Among other things - for example, the manifold contacts of the 
Arabs and Muslims with large parts of North Africa, West Asia and 
al-Andalus, as well as the previous cultures of the Mediterranean 
basin, including the Near Eastern Hellenistic culture - this renaissance 
gave expression to a tradition of science and philosophy, comprising 
among many others, thinkers such as Kindī, Farābī, Ibn Sīnā, at-
Tawḥīdī, Ibn Miskawayh, Ibn Māğa and Ibn Rušd. Notwithstanding 
their differences, these thinkers shared a common oeuvre that can be 
defined in terms of three features: “(1) adoption of the ancient 
philosophic classics as an educational and cultural ideal in the 
formation of mind and character; (2) a conception of the common 
kinship and unity of mankind; and (3) humanness, or love of 
mankind” (cf. Kraemer 1992: 10). In addition to this tradition and, of 
course, the earlier religious traditions of exegesis (tafsīr), 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and ḥadīṯ, two other traditions developed, more or 
less in the same period: (1) the theological tradition, known as ʿilm al-
kalām, whose development into a systematic discipline based on 
rational arguments is intimately connected with the school of the 
Muʿtazila; (2) the mystical tradition known as tasawwuf (or ʿirfān, 
i.e., gnosis) that favors spiritual experience rather than 
rational/discursive knowledge.2 
Without dwelling further upon the historical aspects of this 
picture, or entering into any further details about its multifarious 
implications, in relation to Islām’s wider development as a belief 
system (ʿaqīda), we cannot refrain from asking the question of how 
and why the Graeco-Arabic renaissance in medieval Islamic culture 
deviated from its historic progressive path.   
To answer this question, several modern scholars have pointed to 
a number of political and ideological factors, including among other 
things:3  
 
1. The disintegration of ʿAbbāsid authority in ʿIrāq, in the early 
tenth century, and the declining hegemony of the ruling caliphal 
elite in power and decision-making centers at different levels, 
                                                        
1 For more on the political, social, and ideological factors behind the Graeco-
Arabic translation movement, see cf. Gutas (2012), esp. part 2.2.-3, 4.1-2.  
2  Of course, this division between the different traditions should not be 
understood in this strict sense of absolute separation. In the context of Islamic 
culture, the various Islamic traditions of knowledge emerged and existed in 
interdependency with each other. 
3 I make no claims whatsoever that the factors mentioned here constitute an 
exhaustive list. 
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mainly as a result of civil wars, as well as territorial losses and 
the loss of political and economic sovereignty – which was 
always dependent on the security of Baġdād and other urban 
centers such as Kūfa, Baṣra, and Samarrā’ and the security of 
their frontiers. These developments, and many of these 
geopolitical fragmentations, which (as Šawqī Ḍayf shows 4 ) 
ultimately led to the creation of mono-confessional enclaves and 
minor - relatively independent - dynasties, in the place of the 
poly-ethnic, central authority in Baġdād  - was greatly aided by 
the influx of the “semi-nomadic” Selğuk Turks into the upper 
levels of the caliphal administration5 . The Selğuks, who had 
been hired during the reign of al-Muʿṭasim (r. 833-844) to form a 
professional army for his “retaliatory expedition against 
Byzantium,” 6  were very often individuals with a military 
background. This was in sharp contrast to the former 
administrative machinery of the ʿAbbāsid government, which 
was run by employees with administrative skills. In contrast to 
this latter administrative class, which somehow formed a hybrid 
of Graeco-Arabic and Persian culture, the rising Selğuks 
succeeded gradually in dominating the army and in taking 
charge of the political authority in Baġdād, but showed - with 
just a few exceptions7 - no serious interest in secular culture and 
learning 8 ; instead - it is argued - they turned to the 
institutionalization of orthodox Sunnī jurisprudence and 
theology. From this point of view, due to this Selğuk influx, the 
official patronage of secular - and especially Greek - learning 
and culture of the early ʿAbbāsids, “which favored more 
rationalist schools of thought,” was replaced by what is 
commonly called “the Sunni revival of the eleventh century.”9 
Along with this development, which flourished at the expense of 
the intellectual diversity that had prevailed earlier, scholars also 
point to the exclusion of rationality in the field of theology due 
to the “permanent withdrawal of caliphal support for the 
Muʿtazila in the aftermath of the so-called inquisition (miḥna) 
instituted first by Caliph al-Mutawakkil and then by al-Qādir.”10 
Ever since, Islamic legal and political thinking became less open 
to accepting the rational study of the Qurʾān, as the exegete 
(mufassir) remained within the descriptive task of, say, 
                                                        
4 Šawqī Ḍayf (1973), 9-27. 
5 G. A ́goston, B. Masters (2009), xxv-xxxvi. 
6 J. S. Codoñer (2014), 279. 
7 For two of these few exceptions see S. F. Starr (2013), 395. 
8 However, this view seems to be contestable; see e.g., cf. S. F. Starr (2013), 
394-406. 
9 G. Makdisi, (1973), 155-68; J. Berkey (2003), 189-202; D. Ephrat (2000), 1-
6.  
10 R. C. Martin, et. al. (1997), 35. See also J. Van Ess (1997), 446-508. 
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explaining the meaning of the Qurʾānic passages in accordance 
with “the views of the companions [of the Prophet], and the 
opinions of the ʿulamāʾ (aqwāl ʿulamāʾ al-salaf).11 This resulted 
in a mode of thinking, known as traditionalism, which has 
prevented Islamic thought from renewing itself, thus laying 
fertile ground for the age of decay (inḥiṭāṭ), largely by 
undermining the continuity and development of “the heritage of 
Hellenized Islam.” 12 Furthermore, this traditionalism 
marginalized the discourses of the demonstrative and natural 
sciences, while at the same time not recognizing the priority of 
axiomatic rules (al-istidlāl al-burhānī) in theological and 
scientific matters. This, in fact, explains - at least, according to 
this perspective – why traditionalism continues to inform the 
patterns of thinking in post-colonial Muslim societies, including 
the cultural patterns that sustain both the patterns of teaching and 
learning within the educational institutions. Moreover, this 
approach asserts that the growth of Islamism in the early 
twentieth century is the result of the continued dominance of this 
tradition as it has instrumentalized its enormous moral authority 
to equate the entire enterprise of the nahḍa with religious reform 
(iṣlāh) on the basis of a fundamentalist vision of reality. This 
vision, which is rooted in the anti-rationalist and anti-
philosophical Sunnī orthodox tradition, gradually became the 
central ideological frame of reference against which all kinds of 
knowledge must be legitimized.  
 
2. The so-called “closure of the gate” of iğtihād and the prevalence 
of taqlīd, that is, “imitation, or adherence to the teachings of the 
classical jurists.”13 Due to this enclosure, which resulted in the 
formation of a fixed frame of reference within the field of the 
religious sciences (al-ʿulūm al-šarʿiyya), traditional ways of 
learning gained widespread legitimacy, both within and outside 
the religious education system. This, in turn, hampered the 
development of Arab-Islamic thought on a rational basis because 
of its almost exclusive reliance on transmitted tradition (naql) 
and consensus (iğmāʿ) rather than reason (ʿaql) and deductive 
inference (burhān). This whole tendency culminated towards the 
end of the 11th century with Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (1058–1111) 
whose teachings became the guiding principles of the emerging 
Selğuk regime, which rejected all ideas and beliefs that deviated 
from certain core creeds of “orthodox Sunnī Islām” as idolatrous 
human inventions (bidaʿ). Indeed, Ġazālī’s writings - we are told 
- were to play a profound role in future Sunnī thinking in two 
                                                        
11 M. Q. Zaman (2012), 97. 
12 B. Tibi (2009), 255. 
13 F. E. Peters (2003), 117-118. 
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substantial ways: (i) he discouraged Muslim scholars from 
addressing substantive philosophical and scientific questions, or 
at least new points of view on the relation between faith and 
reason (al-naql wa-l ʿaql), between faith and free will (irāda) 
and (ii) led them to focus instead on methods for integrating 
practical morality, piety and spirituality properly into the frame 
of religious disciplines, first and foremost the legal aspects of 
Islamic law (ʿulūm aš-Šarīʿa) – as summarized in his: 
Revivification of the Religious Sciences (Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn) and 
The Alchemy of Happiness (Kimiya-yi saʾadat). This tendency of 
Ġazālī’s work - which can be characterized as a theological 
pursuit of a “Just Balance (Qisṭās Mustaqīm)” that he envisioned 
as a return to the Qurʾān and the prophetical ḥadīṯ in accordance 
with The Standard of Knowledge in Logics (Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī 
fann al-manṭiq) – led Arab-Islamic thought towards a trajectory 
of de-Hellenization, and thus ultimately, de-rationalization. This 
development has played an important role in enabling the 
appearance of an Arab-Islamic mode of thinking, which “sought 
knowledge through gnostic illumination (ʿirfān)” due mainly to 
ancient oriental, Neoplatonic, and Manichean mystical 
influences.14 With this regression towards irrationalism, which at 
least in Ġazālī’s version meant the definitive refutation of 
Aristotelian metaphysics and natural sciences, Arab-Islamic 
thought has limited itself to justifying “the epistemological 
authority of the Qurʾān and sunna” (cf. Griffel 2009: 116), 
including such issues as the juridical context in which analogy 
(qiyās) can be applied, as well as doctrinal purity, that is, the 
definition of the “right belief or purity of faith [...] in accordance 
with the teaching and direction of an absolute extrinsic 
authority,”15 all of which had culminated in the withstanding of 
“the intruding rational sciences” (al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya al-
daḫīla).16 The central role that the traditionalist ʿulamāʾ played 
in shaping the mainstream Muslim imaginary, and the public 
discourse in general, both in the social and cultural realms, as 
well as the realms of learning institutions following the 
independence of many Arab states in the aftermath of World 
War II, reinforced the authority of this tradition, which in turn 
                                                        
14 A. Tayob (2004), 115. This is the thesis famously advanced by M. ʿA. al-
Ğābirī in his magnum opus Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī (“Critique of the Arab 
Reason”), which comprises, among others, two volumes: Naqd al-ʿAql al-
ʿArabī: Takwin al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī (1982); and Bunyat al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī (1986). 
Others find such a thesis simply untenable as an interpretation of Ġazālī’s 
enterprise, for example, F. Griffel (2009).  
15 Charles, J. Callan (1913), 330.  
16 Historians of Arabic science have devoted extensive studies to this problem 
of the decline of Graeco-Arabic science and philosophy after Ġazālī. 
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reinforced the ʿulamā’s “monopoly of definition and 
interpretation with regard to the sacred texts.”17  
 
 
The culture shock of Western modernity in the Arab-Islamic 
world: very brief overview 
 
According to some scholars, the declining trend or the symptoms of 
intellectual stagnation in Islām continued, with varying degrees of 
intensity, until about the rise of the Ottoman sultanate, when Islamic 
culture started flourishing again due to a brief but powerful revival of 
interest in science, as the result of enhanced intellectual innovation 
and creativity during the centuries that followed the Turkish capture 
of Constantinople in 1453. According to others, the decline of Islamic 
culture continued even right up to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 
the late eighteenth century. Notwithstanding the accuracy of such 
opinions, and the positions in between them, the remaining section 
will pick up the thread at the point where we left off earlier, and 
develop another line of argument regarding the culture shock- 
experience of Arab-Islamic thought due to its encounter with the 
West. This will set the scene for the papers presented in this special 
issue. 
In this account of the birth of the nahḍa - which is accepted by 
most scholars in the field - it is, roughly speaking, legitimate to say 
that the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt marks the decisive turning 
point towards the period of ‘awakening’ from centuries of intellectual 
slumber in the Arab Muslim world. The invasion was - one can argue, 
and it is indeed often argued - an unpleasant surprise for the Arabs at 
many different levels. Due to this invasion, which set the stage for the 
modern colonial encounter in the Middle East, Arab societies found 
themselves face to face with an advanced industrial power, combining 
in itself science-based technology, as well as economic, legal and 
bureaucratic rationality. Many, if not most, of these societies were still 
in the ruinous state in which the Ottomans had left them. That is, still 
agricultural, non-industrialized and quasi-feudal. Yet, at the same 
time, the Arabs’ recognition of the new reality, that is, their 
realization of each and every aspect that formed part of the West’s 
superiority was something that threatened the Arab Muslim world’s 
collective self-image and self-esteem, both of which were so 
inextricably bound up with being ‘the birthplace of civilization’ 
(mahd al-ḥaḍāra). 
The Arab Muslim world came to realize how very far it still had 
to go in order to rehabilitate this civilizational status - a fact that 
becomes apparent when looking at the writings of the “reformist” 
intellectuals of that period and its remnants within current debates. In 
                                                        
17 Ursula Günther (2006), 142. 
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the course of its pre-modern history, that is, when Turkish conquerors 
established their rule within the “whole of the Arabic-speaking world 
(including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Irāq, and Transjordan),” 18 
Arabic thought had already undergone a temporary setback during the 
Ottoman era - which also to some extent had eroded its cultural 
sovereignty and gradually pushed the older rationality of medieval 
Arabic science into retreat. In other words, in this perspective, the 
series of devastating setbacks that the Arab Muslim world suffered in 
the aftermath of European colonial domination was nothing but the 
culminating point of tendencies that had begun decades before, 
starting in the Ottoman era and later accentuated with European 
“encroachment” on the Arab provinces within the Ottoman 
sultanate.19  
After decades of Ottoman domination, and endless struggles to 
establish and defend a distinct Pan-Arab identity, the Arab Muslim 
world was now facing perhaps its greatest challenge: i.e., the colonial 
challenge of Western modernity. The Western and, to a lesser extent, 
Ottoman colonial presence, which are viewed by many scholars as 
keys to “the first glimmers of what could be called a national 
consciousness”20 in the Arab Muslim world, provided fertile ground 
for self-critical and self-interrogating currents of thought (naqd ḏātī). 
In spite of their internal differences, these currents had two common 
features: on the one hand, the striving “for authenticity with regard to 
Arab cultural identity” in view of the challenges coming from the new 
colonial threat; and, on the other hand, the endeavour to locate - and 
provide solutions tailored specifically to - the structural problems 
behind the Arab world’s cultural, social and technological 
stagnation.21 
In a sense, therefore, the nahḍa project in the mid-nineteenth 
century was also the beginning of an emerging national consciousness 
within the context of both anti-Ottoman and anti-colonialist struggles 
for liberation and independence. Somehow, paradoxically, though 
emerging from a rejection of “Western cultural imperialism”, the 
diverse currents of thought, which began to grow and flourish in the 
age of nahḍa, due in major part to this national consciousness, “aimed 
at achieving their goal through the selective adoption of Western 
modernity” (cf. Hassan 2001).22 The proponents of these currents of 
                                                        
18 L. Steet (2000), 32. 
19 S. Eddin Ibrahim (2006), 3.  
20  J. Shalan (2006), 129. Such a perspective might help one to better 
understand nationalism’s instant and widespread appeal amongst the 
intellectual elite and its middle-class allies across the Arab world who felt 
increasingly threatened first by the Ottomans, and then by European 
colonialism. This explains, at least to some extent, why in that period renewal 
and reform became pan-national priorities for all Arab intellectuals. 
21 W. S. Hassan, (2001), 40. 
22 It is in this sense that one may understand Ḥassan Ḥanafī’s remark that 
Arab thought consists of three different aspects: “(1) classical Islamic 
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thought were intellectuals, who, in different ways, sought to 
reconsider the problem of past and present (al-māḍī/al-ḥāḍir), of 
authenticity and contemporaneity (aṣāla/muʿāṣara), of heritage and 
renewal (turāṯ-tağdīd), in the hope of uncovering true potentialities of 
enlightenment (tanwīr) and creativity (ibdāʾ), as well as progress 
(taqaddum) and modernity (al-ḥadāṯa), especially in matters of 
national independence (taḥarrur waṭanī), liberty, equality and 
democracy. Even “women’s emancipation” became a major issue of 
debate (Taḥrīr al-marʾa: Qāsim Amin, 1865- 1908). Among many 
other things, these thinkers also addressed issues regarding the 
“characteristics of despotism” (ṭabāʾiʿ al-istibdād: al-Kawākibī, 1888-
1966); the revitalization of Islamic šarīʿa as a frame of reference for 
“Science, Civilization, and Technology” (al-Islām Dīn al-ʿIlm wʾl- 
Madaniyya: M. ‘Abduh, 1849-1905); the historicity of “Pre-Islamic 
Poetry” (al-šiʿr al-ğāhilī: Ṭāha Ḥussein, 1889-1973); the 
compatibility of Islām and secular governing, e.g., al-Islām wa Uṣul 
al-Ḥukm by ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq (1888-1966); while others, like Rifāʿa 
at-Ṭahṭāwī (1801-73) and Ğ. al-Dīn al-Afġānī, wrote about the 
marvels of the “Culture of Parisian Society” and the dangers of 
“agnostic naturalism” (Ar-rad ʿalā ad- Dahriyyīn).  
Indeed, the early intellectual proponents of the modern Arab 
nahḍa were very often employing different - sometimes even 
conflicting - approaches and methodologies in their writings, and they 
were doing so for different purposes, and from different ideological 
standpoints, reflecting a tension between two different positions and, 
accordingly, two different understandings of the reasons and the cures 
for the stagnation into which Arab-Islamic societies had declined. In 
spite of this, however, they were at least implicitly engaged in the 
same task and responding substantially to the same “social and 
economic pressures” 23; pressures, which in turn resulted in feelings of 
alienation, and the “feeling of disjuncture”, that further undermined 
confidence in the value, utility and assumed superiority of the Arab-
Islamic heritage as a “fundamental framework of reference” (iṭār 
marğaʿī).24 Overcoming this alienation, which had befallen the Arab-
Islamic world because of its failure to meet the new demands of 
cultural progress and modernity, became the common task of the pan-
Arab national consciousness. In the minds of some of these 
intellectuals, the only recourse the Arab Muslim world had for 
overcoming this alienation was:  
 
1. the appropriation of modernity, both in its material and 
institutional dimensions, as well as the secular epistemology of 
the human and social sciences; this, however, not in the sense of 
                                                                                                            
heritage; (2) modern Western heritage; and (3) the present realities of the 
Arab world;” cited in Abū-Rabīʿ (2004), 64; also 97-98, and 129.   
23 D. Crecelius (1972), 191. 
24 Michaelle Browers (2006), 73. 
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mere ‘westernization’ (taġrīb), but in the sense of embracing the 
interpretative methodologies of modern human science within 
the broader aim of “reviving the heritage of Islamic rationalism” 
by critically rethinking the cultural and historical, as well as 
epistemological and ideological contexts in which they arose as 
an “underpinning for embracing modernity”.25  
 
In the minds of other intellectuals, however, the only recourse the 
Arab Muslim world had for overcoming this alienation was: 
 
2. to reform (iṣlāḥ) the tradition by means of iğtihād, in order to re-
interpret the classical legal, doctrinal and theological issues “on 
the basis of a return to the ṣalaf al-ṣāliḥ (the pious ancestors)” 
and by defining the Šarīʿa’s main objectives in accordance with 
the overall public interest of the Muslim Umma (maslaḥa) in the 
face of - what these thinkers consider to be – ‘un-Islamic’ 
cultural influences .26 
 
To put it another way, in the first of these two strands, the overcoming 
of alienation and attainment of political modernization, cultural 
revival, and socio-economic wealth, is possible only with the 
wholehearted embrace of the ready-made Western vision of 
modernity insofar as this entails the renewal (tağdīd) of Arabic 
rationality. From the point of view of the second strand, the 
overcoming of the state of nature is possible only through a return to 
the Uṣūl, that is, the fundamentals of Islām as founded by the 
authoritative sources the Qurʾān and the Sunna. On the basis of these 
sources, the classical traditions of ʿilm al-kalām, tafsīr, and fiqh, a 
reconciliation of faith and reason (al-naql wa-l ʿaql), of authenticity 
and contemporaneity (aṣāla/muʿāṣara) can be achieved as a solid 
foundation for the ideal society and state. 
The papers in this issue engage with some methodological and 
thematic debates and questions that, in different ways, encompass 
insights from these two strands of thought, which have come more or 
less to dominate Arab-Islamic thought since the Arab nahḍa in the 
late nineteenth century.  
                                                        
25 Cf. B. Tibi (2012), 67, 74. Qāsim Amīn, Tawfīk al-Ḥakīm (1898-1987), 
Luṭfī as-Sayyid (1872– 1963), Ṭāha Hussein, and many others - mainly 
academics, intellectuals, and thinkers who “reflected the European orientation 
of Egyptian nationalism” represent the most sustained effort in this direction; 
J. Esposito (1998), 70. 
26 The proponents of this strand of thought belonged to the same generation, 
which included traditional intellectuals such as Ṭahṭāwī, Afġānī, and 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh; culturally speaking, these thinkers had an important 
impact by contributing to the nationalist and anti-colonialist orientation of the 
early reformist movement; see A. Belkeziz, (2009), ix-3, 40, and 27-47 (quote 
page 6); cf. Abū-Rabīʿ (2004), 206.  
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Safet Bektovic, in “Tradition and Modernity in contemporary 
Islamic Philosophy”, offers a number of interpretations of what 
‘reform’ (iṣlāḥ) means from the point of view of four contemporary 
Muslim intellectuals, with careful attention to their peculiar 
conceptions of “the role of philosophy in the interpretation of Islām”, 
aiming to understand their differing methodological stances, along 
with the explanatory models they apply to diagnose, examine, and 
analyze the obstacles of Arab-Islamic thought’s path towards 
modernization. Bektovic brings out the various complexities of these 
thinkers’ views on the relationship between tradition and modernity, 
showing how the concealed interaction between ideology and 
methodology in the work of these thinkers shapes their viewpoints 
and the differences in interpretation among them.  
Ulrika Mårtensson, in “Islamic Order: Al-Bannā’s 
Hermeneutical Pragmatism and the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Interpretation”, clarifies the significance of pragmatism in Ḥassan al-
Bannā’s religio-political thinking, as the touchstone for understanding 
the hermeneutics Bannā develops in his writings concerning Šarīʿa as 
a ‘frame of reference’ (marğaʿiyya) for legislation, and his 
accompanying vision of an ‘Islamic order’ (niẓām islāmī). 
Challenging the prevalent view that Bannā’s writings did not have any 
lasting effect on the subsequent development of the Muslim Brothers, 
especially as regards their transformation towards participation in 
electoral politics, and approval of democratic governance, Mårtensson 
argues that the recent breakthroughs, which have all contributed to 
radical changes in the Brothers attitudes towards the political sphere 
are, in fact, guided by a deep commitment to Bannā’s contextual and 
pragmatist approach vis-à-vis matters of interpretation (al-iğtihād) 
and legislation (al-tašrīʿ), and not a departure from, or a radical 
modification of, Bannā’s ideas and methodology, as some modern 
scholars have suggested. Mårtensson concludes by pointing out this 
insight as an important point of departure for further research that 
acknowledges and takes seriously the pragmatist character of the 
Brothers oeuvre and their contemporary predicament.  
Tina Dransfeldt, in “Transcending Institutionalized Islām, 
Approaching Diversity: ʿAbdelmağīd Šarfī’s Conception of a 
Qurʾānic Ethics of Liberation”, focuses on “the intellectual enterprise” 
of the Tunisian thinker, ʿAbdelmağīd Šarfī and his historical critical 
reading of the Islamic tradition. In specifically examining Šarfī’s 
notion of the Qurʾān as an oral discourse rather than a written text, 
Dransfeldt shows how Šarfī’s re-appropriation of the ‘prophetic 
message’ both (1) clarifies the pre-institutional phase of Islām, which 
preceded the formation of orthodoxy as a means of ensuring the 
confessional unity of the community; and (2) uncovers what was then 
an original pre-orthodox phase enriched by doctrinal diversity and 
characterized by open “dialogue, debate, and dispute”. When seen in 
this manner, Dransfeldt argues, the hermeneutic position that Šarfī 
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adopts appears as significantly different from - not analogous to - the 
apologetic methods of inquiry that characterizes the Muslim reformist 
trend.  
Joshua A. Sabih, in “Under the Gaze of Double Critique: De-
colonisation, De-sacralisation and the Orphan Book”, focuses on a 
rarely recognized discourse within contemporary Arab-Islamic 
thought, characterized by a ‘double-critique’ vis-à-vis the self and its 
object in its multifarious manifestations, regardless of whether this 
object takes the form of the ‘West’ or ‘Islām’. As advanced by the 
French-Moroccan intellectual al-Khaṭībī, this theory uncovers the 
ideological limitations of the enlightenment narratives of the so-called 
‘West’, which reinforces the euro-centric hegemony in matters of 
science and philosophy in the name of universality. At the same time 
this theory deconstructs politico-theological narratives that seek to 
sacralise the interpretations generated by Islamic orthodoxy. In 
replacement of these essentially theo-centrist traditions that dominate 
both sides, Khaṭībī proposes an entirely new way of thinking that sets 
out to explore, interpret and make sense of other cultures in terms 
freed of relations of domination and binary oppositions.  
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